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Introduction
‘Think globally, act locally’ has long been a rallying cry for 
progressives and green activists. In this article I stress the 
importance of thinking globally before acting locally in the 
wake of the 2015 Paris conference on climate change.
parties, while leaving actual policy design 
to countries operating under a ‘pledge 
and review’ arrangement. The pledge-
and-review procedure leaves untouched 
the incentives for free-riding that sank 
the Kyoto Protocol, while, on the question 
of the agenda for effective actual action, 
the Paris Agreement leaves a substantial 
policy vacuum. New Zealand, like most 
other countries, can continue to wait 
to see what everyone else does, while 
emphasising the broadly correct and 
persuasive point that we are too small 
to save the planet on our own. After 
watching this process of free-riding play 
out over the past two decades, and after 
watching calls for global good citizenship 
fall on deaf ears – especially the bit of 
the story where rich nations are asked 
to agree to large-scale wealth transfers in 
favour of poorer nations – it is time to go 
back to first principles.
At the outset it has to be emphasised 
that in the absence of a legitimate, 
hegemonic world government to legislate 
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Both the content of the Paris Agreement 
and the political rhetoric surrounding it 
feel like a return to 1992 following the 
signing of the Rio Declaration and the 
United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change. Then, as now, the 
air was filled with high aspirations, and 
declarations of political commitment, 
and promises of future action; but now, 
as then, the real work of translating 
aspirations into effective action remains 
to be done. From Rio to Kyoto took five 
years; the road to general acceptance 
that the Kyoto Protocol had failed took 
another 15 years. Having thus come 
full circle on climate change policy, it 
is important to reflect on mistakes that 
were made first time around, and to draw 
lessons for practical policy in the coming 
decade. 
Among the policy mistakes made 
after Rio, two stand out. One was to 
underestimate the importance of free-
riding. The second was to adopt too 
narrow a set of options for the policy 
agenda. 
The Paris Agreement tries to limit 
free-riding by having all countries as 
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and enforce policy, many of the textbook 
solutions for market failure have to be 
rethought. As Barrett points out, 
The approach [to global climate 
policy] taken thus far has been 
to set economy-wide targets and 
timetables. This approach would be 
ideal were it possible to regulate the 
world’s greenhouse gas emissions in 
top-down fashion. Unfortunately, 
however, the world’s governance 
arrangements have to work from the 
bottom up. The world does not have 
one government; it has nearly 200. 
An agreement to reduce emissions 
must not only be attractive from 
the perspective of the global good. 
It must also be something to which 
countries individually want to accede 
and to adhere. (Barrett, 2009, p.2)
The issue
Climate change is a problem requiring 
collective action in an age when the 
prevailing ideological climate is strongly 
individualist and anti-collectivist. But 
while ideology is not helping, the real 
stumbling block to reaching an effective 
global policy regime to cut back carbon 
emissions is economic. We are up against 
the ‘tragedy of the commons’ – the 
difficulty of securing the supply of a 
public good when the individual incentive 
for all players is to free-ride on the efforts 
of others. As Gollier and Tirole summarise 
the situation:
Most benefits of mitigation are global 
and distant, while costs are local 
and immediate. Climate change is 
a global commons problem. In the 
long run, most countries will benefit 
from a massive reduction in global 
emissions of GHGs, but individual 
incentives to do so are negligible. 
Most of the benefits of a country’s 
efforts to reduce emissions go to 
the other countries. In a nutshell, a 
country bears 100% of the cost of 
a green policy and receives, say, 1% 
of the benefits of the policy, if the 
country has 1% of the population 
and has an average exposure to 
climate-related damages. Besides, 
most of these benefits, however small, 
do not accrue to current voters, but 
to future generations. Consequently, 
countries do not internalize the 
benefits of their mitigation strategies, 
emissions are high, and climate 
changes dramatically. (Gollier and 
Tirole, 2015, p.6)
Free-riding – the basis of the ‘tragedy 
of the commons’ – is a staple topic in the 
elementary economics textbooks, and the 
textbooks quickly offer three standard 
solutions. Either individual incentives 
have to be brought into line with the 
common good by pricing in all relevant 
externalities, or a legitimate collective or 
central authority with a clear mandate 
and adequate enforcement powers must 
intervene to block or restrict any market-
driven activities that threaten the common 
good, or some combination of the two.  
How cap-and-trade came to dominate  
the options
Economists instinctively favour pricing 
as an essential component of any policy 
response because if prices are wrong, 
then individuals have the incentive to 
subvert or evade any command-and-
control regulations that may be imposed, 
triggering the need for costly and probably 
ineffective enforcement measures.1 In 
policy debates over climate change to date 
the idea of directly pricing in the externality 
has generally been framed in terms of a 
carbon tax imposed by some legitimate 
central authority. The command-and-
control alternative has been framed as 
each country being allocated a quota limit 
on its emissions and required, on pain of 
enforceable direct sanctions, to limit its 
domestic emissions. The third theoretical 
option – a combination of the two – 
has been cap-and-trade, under which a 
command-and-control global emissions 
cap is allocated via a market process that 
is designed to seek out the most cost-
effective mitigation options. 
A standard argument, advanced by a 
lot of economists at the beginning of the 
big climate change policy debates of the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, ran in three 
steps:2
•	 A	global	carbon	tax	was	ruled	out	by	
the absence of any legitimate global 
taxing authority and by the perceived 
moral hazard problems of having 
a single agency handling the vast 
revenues involved.
•	 Pure	command-and-control	is	
notoriously inefficient when 
compared to an arrangement 
that focuses all effort on securing 
the lowest-cost means of cutting 
emissions, so some way of bringing 
market incentives to bear was 
needed.
•	 Cap-and-trade	looked	like	a	way	to	
do this, provided that a couple of 
obvious problems could be solved:
– a strictly limited quantity of 
tradable permits would have to be 
allocated on an acceptable basis to 
a set of initial recipients;
– the new global permits market 
would have to meet some basic 
requirements of competitiveness 
and liquidity.
Briskly abstracting from the complexity 
of the real world, Bertram (1992) proposed 
that emission permits be allocated on a per 
capita basis across the world’s population, 
with each permit denominated as one 
individual’s share of the global annual 
carbon cap. As the cap tightened over time 
the scarcity value of permits would rise, but 
In policy debates over climate change 
to date the idea of directly pricing in the 
externality has generally been framed in 
terms of a carbon tax imposed by some 
legitimate central authority.
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as technological progress reduced the carbon 
intensity of economic activity their scarcity 
value would fall. A well-functioning permit 
market would reflect these two opposing 
forces, and the resulting price signals would 
guide resources into the most cost-effective 
allocation consistent with sustainability of 
the global environment.
Seduced by the deceptive elegance and 
simplicity of this scheme, I was confident 
that the one obvious problem could be 
overcome: the rich countries would have to 
accept that giving every global inhabitant an 
equal right to the atmospheric commons 
would mean that when the permit market 
opened, the rich would have to buy a big 
chunk of transferable quota from the poor. 
The resulting annual wealth transfer with a 
$20 per ton carbon price would, I calculated, 
have been about $50 billion in 1992 US 
dollars, slightly greater than the total flow of 
international development aid at that time, 
but only a fraction of, for example, global 
arms expenditure. A carbon price of $40 per 
ton would transfer US$100 billion per year. 
This seemed, I argued, a manageable cost to 
save the planet, and I appealed to the self-
interest of the rich as the reason for them 
to accept the cost voluntarily as the cheapest 
way to save the earth’s climate. 
There were two legs to my argument 
that now look, respectively, wildly over-
optimistic and sadly prescient. The wildly 
over-optimistic:
The large industrial countries would 
have to shoulder an adjustment 
burden proportional to the scale 
of their existing polluting activity, 
since the scheme would oblige 
the polluters to pay the rest of the 
world community for their right to 
pollute. The leading polluters would 
naturally be reluctant … However, 
the peoples of the rich countries have 
a large stake in protecting the global 
environment, which might well 
outweigh political pressures from 
powerful industry lobby groups.  
…
The world community faces an 
historic chance actually to achieve 
the development goals to which 
so much lip service is paid on the 
diplomatic circuit, as a by-product 
of that community’s willingness 
jointly to confront the greenhouse 
issue. The developing countries 
deserve no less than full partnership 
in this process. If full partnership is 
denied them, they have the ability 
credibly to threaten ecological 
disaster. Prudence, as well as 
benevolence, should prompt the rich 
to tolerate economic redistribution 
on a very considerable scale. 
(Bertram, 1992, pp.435, 440)
The prescient:
If the opportunity is lost to tackle 
development and sustainability 
as simultaneous parts of a 
joint problem, then the global 
outlook darkens seriously. Either 
the greenhouse effect could be 
held at bay by condemning the 
poor countries to long-term 
underdevelopment; or the South 
might grow for a generation or two 
without regard to the environmental 
consequences, exposing the entire 
global community to the risk of 
catastrophic climate change. (Bertram, 
1992, p.440, emphasis added)
The rest is history. At Kyoto in 1997 the 
rich countries set up a limited emissions 
trading regime among themselves, 
but with no global cap. In place of an 
authoritative and binding global cap, 
country-by-country targets for Annex I 
countries were negotiated, that never came 
close to consistency with a serious global 
carbon budget. No credible enforcement 
machinery emerged. Meanwhile, the 
global south, including China and India, 
was left to roll on with business-as-usual 
emissions-intensive growth. 
Two key mistakes
What, with the benefit of hindsight, 
can one say about the reasoning that 
led many economists in the 1990s and 
2000s to advocate global cap-and-trade? 
Two mistakes stand out. The first was 
over-optimism about the possibility of 
establishing a binding global quantity 
cap on emissions in the absence of a 
global government. Once cap-and-trade 
negotiations moved from a single global 
cap and free allocation of permits per 
capita across the entire global population, 
to the Kyoto arrangement of letting 
countries negotiate their own pre-
specified quantitative targets, the essential 
institutional architecture of my 1992 
plan was dead, and with it the hope of 
confronting the whole global community 
with a uniform common incentive 
to abate. Thereafter, climate change 
negotiations became bogged down in a 
free-riding morass as each country tried 
to minimise its own target and hence its 
compliance costs.
The second common mistake was to 
work from an incomplete listing of the 
options for organising a global policy 
regime, overlooking the option that has 
now abruptly leapt to the forefront in the 
current economics literature: a negotiated 
global carbon price floor secured without 
imposing a global carbon tax. 
The new policy frontier: a negotiated and 
enforceable global price floor
Bertram (1992, pp.431-36) canvassed 
four options, which were presented as an 
exhaustive list:
1. Direct regulation: transparent and 
certain, but
•	 administratively	costly;
•	 hard	to	harmonise	across	many	
countries/jurisdictions;
•	 hard	to	enforce	effectively	(in	the	
absence of a world government) 
or fairly (given the existing 
imbalance of power between large 
and small countries).
At Kyoto in 1997 the rich countries set 
up a limited emissions trading regime 
among themselves, but with no global 
cap.
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2. Carbon tax: the textbook answer, but
•	 the	tax	would	have	to	be	specified	
in some currency, after which 
exchange rates could present a 
problem and could be subject to 
manipulation;
•	 no	global	authority	exists	with	the	
mandate to impose the tax; and 
•	 the	revenues	collected	would	be	
on a huge scale even if there were 
a taxing authority, which would 
present a moral hazard problem.
3. Private litigation: the initiative would 
lie with individuals, agencies and 
companies around the world to sue 
polluters through the courts of each 
country, but
•	 wealthy	polluters	could	stall	
litigation indefinitely;
•	 it	is	unclear	what	sanctions	the	
courts could impose; and
•	 there	would	be	a	loss	of	
sovereignty as each country faced 
having its courts invaded by non-
residents.
4. Tradeable permits: judged best if done 
as laid out in the paper, even though
•	 the	big	wealthy	polluting	
countries would have to swallow 
large wealth transfers to poor low-
emission countries; and
•	 the	likely	attempt	by	large	vested	
interests to capture the scheme 
by seeking grandfathered permits 
would have to be defeated.
Looking down that list it is obvious 
with hindsight that (at least) one option 
was missing. Because the price option 
was framed as a tax, rather than simply 
as a price, the problems of implementing 
a global carbon tax were allowed to 
sink the price option without further 
consideration. Cap-and-trade was the 
fallback means of getting a global price 
in place, but it suffered precisely the same 
fatal flaw as the carbon tax: there was (and 
is) no global authority with the mandate 
and the means to enforce a global policy 
from the top down.3 
Once, however, thinking shifts 
from a top-down to a bottom-up way 
of addressing the global problem, it is 
possible to think of a global (or at least 
widely applied) price for carbon that is 
not secured by means of a global carbon 
tax. All that is required is that a global 
price floor be agreed and enforced by 
some coalition or ‘club’ of nations. This is 
the option that now commands growing 
attention and support among economists. 
It was the subject of the lead article, 
by William Nordhaus, in the American 
Economic Review for April 2015, and 
was the central theme of a heavyweight 
symposium in the September 2015 issue 
of Economics of Energy and Environmental 
Policy, with papers by Weitzman (2015), 
Stiglitz (2015), Gollier and Tirole (2015) 
and Cramton, Ockenfels and Stoft 
(2015).
The proposal runs as follows:
•	 All	countries	that	sign	up	(thereby	
forming a coalition or ‘climate 
club’) agree on a price that is to 
apply to carbon emitted within their 
borders. Ideally the club would be 
the entire global community, but 
smaller coalitions can implement the 
scheme, and there can even be several 
different coalitions, each with its own 
price.
•	 Each	government	within	the	club	
adopts policy measures to bring 
their internal carbon price up to that 
international price. They may do 
this by means of a domestic carbon 
tax, or a tradeable emission permits 
scheme with a floor price set at the 
agreed international price, or any 
other measure they may dream up. 
All revenues from a domestic tax or 
other scheme would remain with 
the national government in the first 
instance (‘subsidiarity’) and would 
be spent or distributed as that 
government chooses.
•	 All	countries	within	the	club	impose	
a uniform tariff at their borders on 
imports from the rest of the world, 
both to incentivise others to join the 
club and as a means of restricting 
carbon leakage.
Of the three components of this 
scheme, only one single thing has to be 
collectively negotiated and agreed: the 
carbon price. The single price commitment 
eliminates the need to negotiate a set 
of country-by-country quantitative 
emission targets. The big advantage of 
going down this route is ‘dimensionality’. 
If the world’s governments are asked to 
agree on (or accept a collective decision 
on) just one single number – the price of 
carbon emissions – they have only that 
one thing to talk about and the success 
or failure of the negotiations would boil 
down to the emergence or non-emergence 
of just one agreed number. (Under the 
Paris Agreement’s pledge-and-review 
replacement for Kyoto, the negotiation has 
to produce something like 200 individual 
country quantitative targets, for emission 
magnitudes the measurement of which is 
itself open to negotiation.) As Weitzman 
summarises it,
A meaningful comprehensive 
quantity-based treaty involves 
specifying as many different binding 
emissions quotas … as there are 
national entities. Each national 
entity has a self-interested incentive 
to negotiate for itself a high cap on 
carbon emissions – much higher 
than would be socially optimal. The 
resulting free-rider problem plagues a 
quantity-based approach …
… low dimensionality argues 
in favour of a one-dimensional 
harmonized carbon price over 
an n-dimensional harmonized 
cap-and-trade system among n 
nations … Put directly, it is easier 
to negotiate one price than n 
quantities – especially when the one 
price can be interpreted as ‘fair’ in 
terms of equality of marginal effort’. 
(Weitzman, 2015, pp.38, 40)
The single price commitment eliminates 
the need to negotiate a set of country-by-
country quantitative emission targets.
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The detailed policies to make that 
price applicable are left to participating 
governments, as are any revenues 
generated. This principle of subsidiarity 
means that the issue of international 
redistribution of income and wealth is 
dropped from the negotiating agenda, so 
that absolute priority can be given to the 
single goal of establishing a global carbon 
price. (I used to think that the two goals – 
a carbon price and global equity – could 
be achieved jointly, but I now concede 
that the myopic self-interest of the rich 
is an immovable roadblock, and that we 
simply have to work around it.)
The two greatest strengths of this 
approach are: (1) the creation of a 
uniform and universal incentive across 
many countries to reduce emissions 
wherever it is cost-effective to do so under 
the prevailing carbon price; and (2) an 
enforcement mechanism (border tariffs) 
that operates impersonally through 
the market rather than requiring legal 
prosecution, specific targeted sanctions 
or a threat of military intervention, and 
which provides an incentive for non-
participant countries to join the club.
Nobody thinks this approach would 
be simple in practice. All the economists 
writing along these lines agree that it 
faces enormous obstacles and objections, 
though probably less serious than those 
confronting the alternatives, and with 
far greater chance of solving the climate 
change problem than those more 
‘politically feasible’ alternatives. 
Thinking globally, acting locally
What does this imply for national 
policy? Start with the clear recognition 
that the central problem is free-riding, 
which means conceding that the current 
New Zealand government stance can be 
defended as economically rational given 
the current global policy regime. For a 
‘typical’ or ‘representative’ individual 
around the world there are likely to be 
more penalties than rewards from living 
in a country that acts unilaterally to cut its 
carbon emissions in a world where others 
free-ride. The benefits of unilateral action 
are intangible (mainly moral satisfaction); 
tangible gains are negligible for a small 
country that acts alone, since there will be 
no climate change mitigation benefits to 
one’s grandchildren so long as free-riding 
by others continues. In stark contrast, 
whatever costs may result from living in 
a world that collectively puts a price on 
carbon, those costs pale into insignificance 
beside the tangible benefits from effective 
mitigation. It is, in short, entirely ‘rational’ 
for voters to support global action but 
oppose unilateral national action.
Individual citizens may have agency 
within their nation, but they have none 
at global level. To get the desired global 
result one still has to act through one’s 
national government, so what is needed 
is a policy that can be adopted by 
individual nations without plunging them 
into unproductive economic pain, and 
which can then evolve into a collective 
global policy that provides a consistent 
worldwide incentive to cut back carbon 
emissions. We are searching here for what 
economists call incentive compatibility. 
We are looking for a national strategy 
that does not require premature and 
costly unilateral action, but that has a 
serious chance of providing a focal point 
around which international negotiations 
may be organised. Hence the appeal of 
the climate club idea.
The form of each potential club 
member’s upfront price commitment 
is ‘I will if you will’: in other words, a 
single country does not bind its citizens 
to anything unless and until a coalition 
of some minimal credible size emerges. 
But once the coalition reaches critical 
mass the international agreed price 
would come into being. All that has to 
be done by the lead country or countries 
is to call for formation of that coalition, 
invite others to join, and perhaps propose 
an actual price as the starting point for 
negotiations. Painless leadership has 
some appeal, surely?
The second element of the strategy, 
provided that a viable (critical-mass) 
club forms, would be translating the 
agreed-upon price into domestic terms. 
New Zealand would be able to do this 
under the existing emissions trading 
scheme by putting a floor price under the 
market for New Zealand units (NZUs), 
and by blocking or taxing the import 
of carbon credits from any country that 
has not joined the club and imposed a 
corresponding floor price or carbon tax. 
Or we could move to a carbon tax as the 
Greens have proposed.
The third element – the crucial part of 
making any club stable – is excludability: 
imposing a meaningful cost or penalty 
on those who do not join the club, which 
provides the incentive for them to join. 
Central to the climate club proposal is 
border adjustment. Members of the club 
would impose a harmonised tariff to 
apply on all goods imported from non-
participating countries. Non-membership 
would then mean confronting the carbon 
tariff whenever trading with countries in 
the club. The tariff would both restrict 
carbon leakage and provide the incentive 
for new members to join up. 
Tariff design
There are two options for this tariff 
design: a tariff based on the carbon 
content of imported goods, or a simple 
penalty tariff on all imports from non-
members. Stiglitz and Helm have argued 
for the first of these, mainly as a targeted 
weapon against carbon leakage, but partly 
also on the basis that solid precedents 
would make it WTO-legal. Nordhaus 
argues for the second – a uniform penalty 
tax on non-participants – on the basis 
that (1) it is simple compared with the 
complexity of a carbon tariff; (2) the 
A carbon-pricing club would have an 
inclusionary rather than an exclusionary 
aim, and would be pursuing the global 
good rather than just the self-interest of 
members.
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relevant damages to be countervailed are 
not so much carbon leakage as climate 
change in general, which non-participants 
are failing to address via the pricing 
route; and (3) the central purpose is to 
incentivise club membership (Nordhaus, 
2015, pp.1348-50).
Are such ‘border carbon adjustments’ 
(tariffs) novel, or incompatible with WTO 
rules, or unthinkable? Consider the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA), 
under which a group of countries led by 
the United States is to form an exclusive 
club with various market barriers to be 
overcome by non-members wishing to 
trade with the club. Whereas the TPPA is, 
I would argue, a negative example of club 
formation, with exclusion of China and 
ascendancy of the US as one of its core 
purposes, it is certainly not incompatible 
with existing trade law. A carbon-pricing 
club would have an inclusionary rather 
than an exclusionary aim, and would be 
pursuing the global good rather than just 
the self-interest of members. But it would 
use the same essential defensive tool of a 
common external tariff or other barrier 
against non-members to ensure there is 
a benefit of membership and a cost of 
defection from the club. 
Nordhaus, however, accepts that his 
proposal for a straightforward penalty 
tariff on non-participants could run 
counter to international law as it currently 
stands, and he bluntly proposes that: 
an important aspect of the proposal 
will be a set of ‘climate amendments’ 
to international-trade law, both 
internationally and domestically. 
The climate amendments would 
explicitly allow uniform tariffs on 
nonparticipants within the confines 
of a climate treaty; it would also 
prohibit retaliation against countries 
who invoke the mechanism. (ibid., 
p.1349)
It is probably true that whatever 
option was chosen for the common tariff, 
someone would challenge it under the 
GATT/WTO rules, and this challenge 
would have to be successfully fought, 
either under the GATT’s chapter XX 
exclusions or by securing a change to 
international law. If a challenge succeeded 
and/or the law could not be changed, then 
in the worst case the carbon club would 
disband and individual nations would fall 
back to the default option of business-as-
usual trade. If the challenge failed, the 
club would immediately gain momentum 
and members. My expectation and hope 
is that any challenge would fail, but it is 
obvious that defeating a challenge would 
be more likely the greater the number 
and weight of nations joining up to the 
carbon club at the start. In short, the 
downside of stepping up to the club-
forming carbon-pricing proposal is the 
possibility of no change from the status 
quo, and the upside is the chance of a 
serious and coordinated assault on global 
warming, using a mechanism that short-
circuits the free-riding problem.
Conclusion
The bottom line is that the Paris 
Agreement has not solved the basic free-
rider problem in climate change policy. 
The quantity-based pledge-and-review 
approach is too complex, too weak and 
too vulnerable to manipulation. A price-
based market mechanism has the potential 
to reduce complexity and manipulation, 
while removing much of the free-riding 
incentive, so long as it embodies strong 
penalties for defection. Two of the leading 
figures in the economic debate summarise 
these points as follows. First, Weitzman:
With the failure of a Kyoto-style 
quantity-based approach, the 
world has seemingly given up on a 
comprehensive global design, settling 
instead for sporadic national, sub-
national, and regional measures. 
These partial measures seem far 
from constituting a socially efficient 
response to the global warming 
externality. Perhaps … the Kyoto-
style quantity-based focus on 
negotiating emissions caps embodies 
a bad design flaw. The arguments of 
this paper indicate a way in which 
negotiating a binding internationally-
harmonized nationally-collected 
minimum price on carbon emissions 
might help to internalize the global 
warming externality. (Weitzman, 
2015 p.49)
Second, the ever-cautious Nordhaus:
Here is the bottom line: … 
without sanctions there is no stable 
climate coalition other than the 
noncooperative, low-abatement 
coalition. This conclusion is soundly 
based on public-goods theory, on 
C-DICE model simulations, on the 
history of international agreements, 
and on the experience of the Kyoto 
Protocol. … 
… an international climate 
treaty that combines target carbon 
pricing and trade sanctions can 
induce substantial abatement. … The 
attractiveness of a Climate Club must 
be judged relative to the current 
approaches, where international 
climate treaties are essentially 
voluntary and have little prospect of 
slowing climate change. (Nordhaus, 
2015, p.1368)
1 There is a strong stream of research led by Elinor Ostrom 
that emphasises the power of voluntary collective action 
through non-price measures to solve tragedies of the 
commons problems, but this works well only at local level: 
for example, protecting local water aquifers from depletion, 
or allocating scarce irrigation water from a shared canal 
system, or managing a clearly bounded fishery. A successful 
pledge and review process following the Paris Agreement 
would vindicate Ostrom’s position at a global scale, but 
would require a truly seismic shift in world politics. See 
Ostrom (1990) and Potete, Janssen and Ostrom (2010). I 
have discussed Ostrom’s ideas in more detail in Bertram, 
2013, pp.10-13.
2 For a straightforward statement of this case see Bertram 
(1992), based largely on an earlier paper that I and 
two colleagues wrote in 1989 for the Ministry for the 
Environment (Bertram, Stephens and Wallace, 1990).
3 There does exist a mechanism in the United Nations 
Charter whereby the UN Security Council could become 
such an authority, by declaring climate change a danger to 
‘international peace and security’ and taking action against 
free-riding nations. 
The bottom line is that the Paris 
Agreement has not solved the basic free-
rider problem in climate change policy. 
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